Volume 48
Issue 1 Winter
Winter 2008

A Look behind the Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Case
Study
David Hurlbut

Recommended Citation
David Hurlbut, A Look behind the Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Case Study, 48 Nat. Resources
J. 129 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol48/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

DAVID HURLBUT*

A Look Behind the Texas Renewable
Portfolio Standard: A Case Study
ABSTRACT
A renewable portfolio standard (RPS - a statutory
requirementto achievea renewableenergy goal by a certain date- is
the tool of choice for many state policy makers concerned about
climate change and the role played by electric generation. Texas
enacted its RPS in 1999; since that time, it has added the most
renewable capacity of any state and has rapidly outpaced its
statutorygoals. The numbers do not tell the whole story, however.
This article examines the Texas RPS from two public policy
perspectives seldom addressedin previous studies: the politics that
shaped the statute creating the RPS and thresholdjudgments made
by the agency implementing the statute. One factor crucial to the
politicalfortunes of the RPS in the Texas Legislaturewas strategic
linkage, that is, associating the RPS with related issues that had
ascended high on the legislative agenda, such as competitive
restructuringof the state's electricity market.
Once the RPS was enacted, the Public Utility Commission
of Texas (PUCT) aimed to build a practicalpolicy framework in
which renewable energy development overall would be a response
both to the RPS mandate and to customer-driven demand. The
PUCT adopted a "carrotand stick" approach, imposing penalties
for falling shortof mandatedgoals, while at the same time creating
a portfolio of measures to ensure that the market was fully able to
respond to consumer demand. The Texas experience suggests that
economically sustainablerenewable energy is the true underlying
objective ofan RPS; building competition into RPS implementation
promotes economic efficiency and increasesdemand for renewable
energy; an RPS, a system of renewable energy credits and greenpower policies works best as an integratedpackage; the regime of
rules needs to be stable; and an RPS goal need not be ambitious in
order to succeed.
A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is the tool of choice for many
policy makers concerned about climate change and the role played by
electric generation. A number of states-as well as Congress-are
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considering an RPS to encourage greater use of technologies that generate
power using wind and other renewable resources.
An RPS is a statutory requirement to achieve a renewable energy goal
by a certain date. The goal can take many forms (usually some percentage of
retail electricity consumption or a specified amount of nameplate capacity),
with varying degrees of specificity as to implementation rules. The essential
features of a statute provide regulators with sufficient authority to set up the
necessary administrative structures, assign requirements, and enforce compliance.' A wide variety of state RPS models already exists, responding to
different policy drivers and incorporating various features.2
Texas established its RPS as part of the legislature's restructuring
of the state's electricity market in 1999.? The original statutory goals were
to install 400 megawatts (MW) of new renewable capacity by 2003 and
increase capacity every two years after that to 2,000 MW by 2009. These
goals represented a marked increase in the state's renewable capacity,
which at the time was 880 MW, most of which was hydroelectric capacity
built by the state's river authorities. Still, the goals were modest4 next to the
76,000 MW of total generating capacity Texas had at the time.
By the numbers, Texas has done the most of any state with its RPS
and has rapidly outpaced its original goals. The state has added 4,268
megawatts (MW) of wind power since 2001.s Not only is that more than any
other state has installed (California is a distant second with 2,439 MW 6 ), it
is more than any other country except Germany, Spain, and India.7

1. In a few cases, states have set non-binding targets that lack enforcement provisions.
This aspirational model is substantially different from the mandatory requirement of an RPS,
however. First, a non-binding aspirational goal does not entail economic consequences. Therefore, it does not alter an economic actor's rational decision-making calculus in a consistent
and predictable manner. Second, an aspirational goal does not effect any predictable change
in future renewable energy demand. A renewable energy developer thus faces similar
investment risk regardless of whether the aspirational goal exists. A market-wide enforceable
mandate creates both the need and the basis for systematic business planning, whereas an
aspirational goal does not.
2. See Karlynn S. Cory & Blair G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States:
Balancing Goals and Rules, ELEC. J., May 2007, at 21.
3. TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904 (Vernon 2007).
4. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 1990-2006 Existing Nameplate and Net Summer Capacity
by Energy Source, Producer Type and State, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/
epa/epa-sprdshts.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
5. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Existing/New REC Capacity Report, http://www.
texasrenewables.com/publicReports/rpt5.asp (lastvisited Feb. 29, 2008).
6. Am. Wind Energy Ass'n, U.S. Wind Energy Projects, http://www.awea.org/projects
(last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
7. JOANNA I. LEWIS, CTR. FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, A COMPARISON OF WIND POWER
INDUSrRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SPAIN, INDIA AND CHINA 3 (2007), available at
http://www.resource-solutions.org/lib/librarypdfs/Lewis.Wind.Industry.Development.
India.Spain.China.July.2007.pdf.
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These numbers do not tell the whole story, however. The
compelling results for Texas belie the contentious legislative politics that
have shaped the RPS law. Rational analysis occasionally played a part in the
debate, but the way the Texas RPS statute evolved in the Texas Legislature
has in fact been an example of what Amitai Etzioni describes as "mixed
scanning" -a sort of guided chaos residing somewhere between rational
planning and simply muddling through.' Mindful of Voltaire's political
axiom "the best is the enemy of the good," RPS advocates recognized that
the ultimate legislation would fall short of what renewable energy policy
experts might consider ideal.
Once the statute took effect, however, the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) ensured that it was linked letter and spirit to the
state's competitive electricity market. The success of the RPS in adding
capacity has been due in no small part to the fact that the PUCT
promulgated rules governing the RIS, green power, and renewable energy
tracking as an integrated package in the context of wholesale and retail
electric competition.
This article examines the Texas RPS from two public policy
perspectives seldom addressed in previous studies: the politics that shaped
the statute creating the RI'S and threshold judgments made by the agency
implementing the statute. The first sections examine the strategies that were
crucial to bringing the RPS into existence by the Texas Legislature. Strategic
linkages, i.e., associating the RPS with related issues that had ascended high
on the legislative agenda, were important to the political compromises that
shaped the ultimate statutory language. Particularly in the initial legislation,
ratepayers themselves underscored crucial substantive linkages with competitive electric restructuring; deliberative polling indicated that customers
regarded the ability to choose renewable power as an important aspect of
a customer's right to choose a retail electric service provider.
The remainder of the article examines how the PUCT implemented
the RPS and the reasoning behind key design decisions. Others have
described what the PUCT did;9 the task here is to examine why particular
choices were made. The commission and its staff took what Barry Rabe
describes as an entrepreneurial approach to the policy task.1" Instead of
doing no more than what the letter of the statute required, the PUCT looked
for opportunities in various areas under its authority to encourage market-

8.

See Amitai Etzioni, Mixed Scanning Revisited, PUB. ADMIN. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 8.

9.

See BARRY RABE, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE TO THE TOP: THE

EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIOSTANDARDS (2006); RYAN WISER & OLE
LANGNISS, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., THE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD IN TEXAS:
AN EARLY ASSESSMENT (2001).

10.

See generally BARRY RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF

AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004).
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consistent renewable energy strategies. The PUCT's rules followed a
renewable energy course that had not been taken before, yet was still
grounded in the statutory authority creating the RPS.
STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF THE TEXAS RPS
The original RPS called for the addition of 2,000 MW of new
renewable generating capacity by 2009. When the law was passed in 1999,
this goal was more than the amount of wind power then operating in
California, the state with the most installed wind power."
The statute itself was parsimonious, specifying only the essential
elements and leaving details to the PUCT. The law cast the goal in terms of
nameplate generation capacity, set a number for the goal, defined which
generation technologies did and did not qualify, placed the burden of
compliance on entities serving retail electricity customers, and authorized
the PUCT to create a credit trading program to facilitate compliance by
retailers.
By the beginning of 2005, however, it was evident that Texas would
reach the 2,000 MW goal within that year, not in 2009. Nearly all of the new
capacity added up to that point was wind power. The legislature increased
the goal to 5,000 MW of new capacity by 2015 and changed the state's
transmission laws to facilitate advance planning for wind power. Besides
the new goal, the bill set a capacity target of 10,000 MW for 2025 and a
target of 500 MW for renewable energy technologies other than wind
power.
Also in 2005, however, the legislature added a provision to reverse
how the PUCT had integrated the RPS with the voluntary green-power
market. The new law required counting voluntary green-power sales
toward the RPS, rather than counting it as additional to the RPS. The
legislature subsequently repealed this particular provision in 2007.
Strategic Linkage
If one factor were crucial to the political fortunes of the RPS in the
Texas Legislature, it would be strategic linkage. In all likelihood, the Texas
RI'S never would have happened as a stand-alone proposition in 1999; nor

11. L. BIRD ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., PoUcIms AND MARKET FACTORS
DRIVING WIND PowER DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2003), available at
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/emp/reports/53554.pdf.In1999, California'swind energy capacity
stood at 1,646 MW, and this increased to only 1,822 MW by 2002, while Texas jumped from
180 MW to 1,096 MW within the same time span. Id. See also Cal. Energy Comm'n, Overview
of Wind Energy in California, http://www.energy.ca.gov/wind/overview.htn-ld(astvisited
Feb. 29, 2008).
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would it have overcome a potentially fatal threat in 2007 without being
linked to larger issues. By associating the RPS with related issues that had
ascended high on the legislative agenda, however, proponents successfully
overcame political opposition and secured a visible, meaningful place for
renewable energy in the state's overall energy development plan.
Strategic linkage worked as a political strategy in Texas largely
because renewable energy-and wind power in particular-has in fact
become increasingly entwined with other important issues. No longer a
boutique technology with negligible economic impact, wind power is
becoming a mainstream participant in a number of important U.S. markets,
of which Texas was the first. Wind power is widespread enough to have a
significant mitigating effect not only on greenhouse gas emissions in Texas,
but on wholesale power prices as well. Transmission planners are
increasingly taking wind power integration into account when assessing
regional grid reliability.12
In the 1999 Texas Legislature, the crucial strategic linkage was with
restructuring. Texas had already laid the groundwork in 1995 for
competitive wholesale electricity markets, 13 and by 1999 the state's political
leaders - including then-Governor George W. Bush - were ready to create
competitive retail electricity markets as well. Senate Bill (SB) 7 set the
statutory parameters of restructuring 4 and was as complicated as it was
controversial. The legislation unbundled the state's investor-owned utilities
15
into structurally independent generation, retail, and wires entities;
established detailed methods for calculating and recovering stranded
costs; 16 put in place transitional mechanisms to prevent market power
17 and encourage market entry;18 and established a system benefit fund

abuse

12. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. oFENERGY, NATIONAL ELEcrRIcTRANSMISION CONGESTION STUDY
54-57 (2006), available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/Congestion.
Study_2006-9MB.pdf; N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AuTH., THE EFFECTS OF
INTEGRATING WIND POWER ON TRANSMISSION SYSTEM PLANNING, RELIABILITY, AND OPERATIONS

(2005), available at http://www.nyserda.org/publications/wind-integration-report.pdf;
MINN. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT-MINNESOTA WIND INTEGRATION STUDY (2006),

availableat http://www.puc.state.mn.us/docs/windrptvol%201.pdf. See also FERC Interconnection for Wind Energy, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,993 (2005) (establishing technical standards
applicable to the interconnection of large wind generating plants).
13. See, e.g., Texas House Passes Bill to DeregulateState's Wholesale ElectricityMarket, ELEC.
UTIL. WEEK, May 29,1995, at 7.
14. S.B. 7, 1999 Leg., 76th Sess. (Tex. 1999) available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/76R/billtext/doc/SBOO007F.doc; summaryavailableathttp://www.legis.state.tx.us/
BillLookup/BillSunmnary.aspx?LegSess=76R&Bill=SB7.
15. See TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.051 (Vernon 2007).
16. See id. §§ 39.251-.265, 39.301-.313.
17. See id. §§ 39.153-.156.
18. See id. § 39.202.
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to help consumers learn about the new market and to help low-income
customers in the transition.' 9
Transmission and distribution remained in the hands of regulated
monopolies, but even there, the goals and operating principles changed.
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) became the independent
operator of the transmission system, unifying into a single control area
critical grid functions that up to that time had been performed by separate
utilities. 20 Transmission costs throughout the ERCOT region were
aggregated and assigned by formula to all ERCOT load, and a unified
methodology for setting system-wide transmission rates eliminated any
transmission rate "pancaking" within ERCOT. 2' The ERCOT system began
to operate as a single market where wind farms in the far western part of
the state could compete to serve load as far away as the Rio Grande Valley
in the south.
Early versions of the restructuring legislation incorporated a goal
for renewable energy capacity. 22 Deliberative polling conducted by Texas
utilities before the 1999 session revealed strong ratepayer support for
renewable power-support that appeared to be accompanied by a
willingness to pay slightly higher rates. 3 The polling results were given
great weight by the state's political leadership, especially those engaged in
negotiating the details of electric restructuring. The RPS was solidly a part
of restructuring from the beginning, even if the details were not.
The original goal was couched in the rhetoric of the new paradigm
that SB 7 attempted to launch: "The introduction of competition and retail
customer choice is expected to create opportunities that will stimulate the
economic development of renewable energy technologies in the state to a

19. See id. §§ 39.902-903.
20. See id. § 39.151.
21. The term "rate pancaking" refers to the multiple, separate transmission charges levied
by each transmission utility carrying power between a generator and the purchaser. Instead,
transmission charges anywhere in ERCOT are assessed on what the statute calls a "postage
stamp" basis: one single transmission access charge applies regardless of how many ERCOT
transmission utilities are between the seller and the buyer. The PUCT developed and
employed the postage stamp method in 1997; the methodology was codified by statute in
1999. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN, § 35.004(d) (Vernon 2007).
22. S.B. 7, 1999 Leg., 77th Reg. Sess. (rex. 1999) (filed).
23. See RONALD LEHR ET AL., LISrENING TO CUsTOMERs: How DELIBERATIVE POLLING
HELPED BUILD 1,000 MW OF NEW RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS IN TExAs (Nat'l Renewable

Energy Lab., 2003), available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/pols/energy/2003/renewable
_energy.pdf; see also NEB. PUB.POWER DiST., CUSTOMER MEETING ON ENERGY ALTERNATIVES:
SUMMARY OF REsuLTs (Aug. 19,2003), availableat http://www.eere.energy.gov/greenpower
/resources/pdfs/0803_nppd.pdf.
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level that achieves the goal [for renewable capacity] through reliance on
market forces alone." 24
The California electricity crisis of 2000-and the political soulsearching it subsequently engendered with respect to deregulated electricity
markets-had not yet happened in 1999, but SB 7 was controversial
nevertheless. Consumer groups opposed restructuring; municipally owned
utilities (MOUs) and rural electric cooperatives (co-ops) supported it as an
option but not as a requirement. 2s Because of the huge potential impact and
high public visibility, the state's political leadership sought as broad a
consensus as possible. The renewable energy goal secured the support of
major players in the state's environmental community for the larger
restructuring effort.
Some of the political compromises made with respect to the RPS in
1999 were the same as those made to secure passage of SB 7 itself. The most
significant compromise was an exemption for MOUs and co-ops. These
providers were not required to unbundle or to open up their retail service
areas to competitors and were therefore exempt from the whole
restructuring initiative. The final version of SB 7 gave them an RPS
26
obligation only if they chose to open their service areas to competitors.
While the strategic linkage with restructuring enabled the RPS to
gain legislative momentum, that same linkage also diluted the effect of the
RPS by excluding roughly 23 percent of state electricity use from an RIPS
obligation. Exempting MOUs and co-ops from restructuring was seen as the
only way to secure passage of SB 7 for the rest of Texas, and the RIPS was
part of the SB 7 wagon train.
Collateral Attack
Early achievement of the SB 7 goal prompted efforts to increase the
RPS in the 2005 legislative session. This time, however, the initiative was
largely put forward on its own, without any significant link to other issues
that were high on the legislative agenda. Standing alone on the hill, the
proposed RPS legislation was an easy target for a collateral attack.
The initial legislation extended the timeline over which the goal was
to increase. Instead of stopping at 2,000 MW of new capacity in 2009, the

24. LEHR ET AL., supra note 23.
25. See, e.g., Senate Committee on Electric Utility Restructuring, Witness List for February
22, 1999 hearing on SB 7. Public Citizen, Consumers Union, and Texas Ratepayers'
Organization to Save Energy testified against SB 7; Texas Public Power Association (on behalf
of the state's MOUs) and Texas Electric Cooperatives (on behalf of the state's electric co-ops)
testified in favor. At that point, SB 7 would have included an MOU or co-op in restructuring
only if the city government or co-op board of directors affirmatively opted for inclusion. Id.
26. See TEx. UTL.CODE ANN. §§ 39.157(e), 39.203, 39.904 (Vernon 2007).
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goal continued to increase for another six years until it reached 5,000 MW
of new capacity by 2015.27
The proposed measure contained another key provision that was
especially important to wind power developers: the creation of competitive
renewable energy zones (CREZs) for new transmission.S Although wind
power development had progressed rapidly in Texas up to that time, at
least one major project had been canceled because of transmission
constraints.29 All of the wind power that had been added in 2001 and 2002
was in one three-county area of West Texas around the town of McCamey.
The 755 MW of wind capacity exceeded the carrying capacity of the existing
transmission system (around 400 MW), causing a significant amount of
curtailment during the windiest and potentially most productive season.
The development of additional transmission capacity was stalled
in a "chicken-and-egg" legal dilemma. Under state law, the PUCT could not
allow a utility to recover the cost of new transmission without finding that
the lines would be used and useful. 3° Wind power developers could not
secure financing without assurance that sufficient transmission would exist,
but construction of new transmission to serve a wind farm could not
commence without the developer first posting a bond to cover the cost of
building the line. Although the bond would be returned once the transmission was in service, wind power developers could ill afford to keep
millions of dollars on hold for the five to seven years needed to build the
line.
CREZs provided the PUCT with statutory authority to designate
areas in which transmission could be developed in advance of the wind
power development, thus getting around the "chicken-and-egg" dilemma.
The bill directed the PUCT, with the technical assistance of ERCOT
transmission planners, to identify areas in the state with the best renewable
energy potential. The PUCT could then designate an area as a CREZ; the
designation carried with it a statutory "yes" to the legal question of whether
the transmission would be used and useful.3

27. S.B. 533, 2005 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) (filed).
28. See ERCOT SYs. PLANNING, ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVES FOR
COMPETITIvE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZoNES IN TExAS (2006), http://www.ercot.com/news/
presentations/2006/ATrCHA_CREZAnalysisReport.pdf; see also WIND COAITmON,
APPROXIMATE WIND ZONE BOUNDARIES AND CREZ SUMMARY TABLE (2006), http://www.
windcoalition.org/PDFs/crez-tableandmap.pdf.
29. See Press Release, Cielo Wind Power, TXU Energy and Cielo Wind Power Announce
Wind Project To Total 240 MW (July 24, 2002), available at http://pepei.pennnet.com/
display-article/150139/6/ARCHI/none/none/1/TXU-Energy-and-Cielo-Wind-Powerannounce-wind-project-to-total-240-MW/ (describing the 240-MW Noelke Hill Wind Ranch
near McCamey, Texas).
30. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.051 (Vernon 2007).
31. See id. § 39.904(g); see also § 36.053(d).
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The early accomplishment of the first renewable goal resulted in
strong political signals to do more.32 To some interests, however, additional
wind power development posed a potential economic loss. In a functioning
electricity market such as ERCOT, greater amounts of wind power
production tend to reduce wholesale power prices - and, consequently, the
revenues that fossil fuel generation earns.
This reduction is due to the fact that real-time wholesale prices in
a functioning market tend to reflect the marginal cost of the marginal unit.
In layman's terms, the market selects the least expensive supply to meet
demand, and the operating cost of the most expensive unit selected
determines the price paid to all of the units selected. The marginal cost of
wind power is zero, however, so when wind power production increases,
what otherwise would have been the most expensive unit is no longer
needed. A unit with a lower marginal cost sets the market price, as shown
in Figure 1.
While renewable energy advocates focused their lobbying efforts
on expanding the RPS and addressing the transmission problem, opponents
moved on what amounted to a collateral attack on the RPS that would deter
additional wind power development. The vehicle was a vaguely worded
rider to the original bill that, when sorted out, required reducing retailers'
RPS requirements by the amount of green power purchased by customers
voluntarily. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the commission
shall ensure that all renewable capacity installed in this state and all
renewable energy credits awarded, produced, procured, or sold [from
renewable capacity] in this state are counted toward the [renewable energy
goal]."'
Green power- optional, customer-chosen retail electricity service
backed entirely by renewable energy -was emerging in the Texas market
as a viable consumer product with an expanding demand base. It was
consistent with some of the most important principles behind restructuring:
customers are entitled to choose electricity service consistent with their
preferences and a customer's choice should be honored.3' Deliberative polls
conducted by Texas utilities prior to restructuring showed that customer
preferences tend to balance two main decision vectors: cost (cheaper is
better) and environmental impact (cleaner is better), a

32. TEx. ENERGY PLANNINGTASKFORCE, TEXAS ENERGY PLAN 2005: ENERGYSECURITY FOR
A BRIGHTTOMORROW 4 (2004), availableat http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/tepc/finalenergyplan.
pdf.
33. S.B. 533, 2005 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (rex. 2005) (engrossed) (adding new TEX. UTIL.
CODE ANN. § 39.904(m)).
34. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.101 (Vernon 2007).
35. Supra note 21.
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The effect of the 2005 rider, however, was to negate the reason
customers would choose green power at the very moment green power was
gaining acceptance in the Texas market. The mathematics of the provision
would cause the purchase of green power to replace someone else's
obligation under the RPS, resulting in no additional use of renewable power
and no offset of fossil fuel generation. Green power certification authorities
said such a change would contradict the consumer expectations that
underlie voluntary green power purchases.36
Favoring the rider were an association of large industrial customers
(including some of the state's largest cogenerators) and one of the state's
largest incumbent retail electric providers. 37 Generally, retailers not
aggressively marketing green power stood to gain in one of two ways:
either their cost of complying with the RPS would become smaller as the
green-power market grew and displaced a larger portion of their obligation
or they would gain customers as demand for green power withered and
their competitors offering green power went out of business.
Industrial cogenerators selling large amounts of power to the
wholesale market stood to gain through higher prices resulting from less
wind power on the ERCOT system. Various analyses conducted after the
2005 session estimated that the reduction in ERCOT wholesale power costs
due to 2,000 MW of wind power is in the neighborhood of half a billion
dollars annually - a reduction of about three percent, based on 2006 prices. 8

36. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Important Notice to PartnersPurchasingGreen
Power in Texas, in GREEN POWER PLANEr NEWSLETTER, NO. 11 (Nov. 11, 2005), available at
Press Release, Center for
http://www.epa.gov/grnpower/newsroom/planetll.htm;
Resource Solutions, Green-E Repeals Its Texas Market Advisory (June 1, 2007), available at
http:/ / www.resource-solutions.org/ where/stakeholderadvisories/2007/
TexasMarket._AdvisoryRepealed_6.1.07.htm. For a discussion of the economic and legal
issues involved, see infra text accompanying notes 42-44.
37. These positions were carried into subsequent rulemaking proceedings at the PUCT
dealing with the statutory language added by the rider. See Texas Industrial Energy
Consumers' Comments on Proposed Rule at 4, Rulemaking Relating to Renewable Energy
Amendments, No. 31852 (P.U.C. OF TEX., Feb. 21, 2006); Response by Reliant Energy Inc. to
Commission Questions Regarding the Implementation of S.B. 20 at 8, No. 31852 (P.U.C. of
Tex., Feb. 21, 2006).
38. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEX., ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION ALTERNATIVES FOR
COMPETrIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES IN TEXAS, at ES-5 (2006), availableat http://www.
ercot.com/news/presentations/2006/ATTCH ACREZ-AnalysisReport.pdf.TheERCOT
analysis estimated the annual generator revenue reductions that would be due to various
amounts of additional wind power on the ERCOT system. On average, ERCOT projected that
annual wholesale costs would fall by $253 million per 1,000 MW of new wind power. The
author's own analysis, begun while a staff economist with the PUCT, examined the price
effect of wind power on the system in 2006, using actual wind power output and system load.
The results showed that the 1,855 MW of wind power on the system at the beginning of 2006
and the 1,280 MW added throughout the year reduced wholesale power costs by more than
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The rider advocated by the industrial cogenerators in 2005 would have
reduced demand for renewable power significantly - either by using green
power to reduce the RPS or by eliminating the green-power market
entirely - thus discouraging new wind power investment and development.
An especially important political dynamic was that the industrial
cogenerators had little to lose if the entire bill were to fail. Maintaining the
status quo would have sustained the legal dilemma that up to that point
was preventing additional transmission development, which in turn would
restrict future wind power growth. Failure of the bill also would have kept
the RPS at the original level set by SB 7, eliminating 3,000 MW of future
demand relating to a larger RPS. Both of these consequences would have
had the effect of reducing wind power growth, thereby promoting higher
wholesale power prices and higher revenues for owners of thermal
generation.
Consequently, opponents were in a position to force a Faustian
choice upon renewable energy advocates: accept the rider or lose
everything else the bill would accomplish.
The bill died during the final hours of the regular session but was
reintroduced in the following special session as SB 20.3' Governor Rick
Perry had called the special session to address school finance and property
tax reform. Renewable energy was not on the agenda, but the chairman of
the Senate Committee on Business and Commerce agreed to
reintroduce - without amendment - the language that existed at the end of
the regular session. Despite concerns expressed over the rider,,° SB 20 came
before both houses of the legislature as a package deal and eventually
passed.
Response
In 2007, renewable energy proponents mounted an effort to repeal
the 2005 rider.4' This time, proponents linked repeal to two major issues that
had found their way to the legislative agenda by the beginning of that year:
global climate change and the need to protect Texas electricity customers
from market power abuse.

$600 million. David Hurlbut, Let Consumers Harness the Wind, Green Power,SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS NEWS, Mar. 24, 2007 (commentary), available at http://www.mysanantonio.com/
opinion/stories/MYSA032507.5H.hurlbutcomment.26003a8.html
39. S.B. 20, 2005 Leg., 79th Sess., 1st Called Sess. (Tex. 2005).
40. H.J., 79th Leg., 1st Called Sess. 471 (Tex. 2005) (Statement of Legislative Intent).
41. See, e.g., Tex. Renewable Energy Industries Ass'n, 2007 Legislative Objectives, Nov.
9, 2006; On-line News Release, Public Citizen, Don't Mess with Texas Renewables: Repeal
Subsection (m), available at http://www.citizen.org/texas/Dereg/Renewables/articles.
cfm?ID=16212.
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Both of these larger issues were propelled by TXU Corporation, the
state's largest electric generating company. A year earlier, TXU announced
plans to build 11 new coal-fired generating plants in Texas, and despite
opposition from environmental and consumer groups, the governor agreed
to seek fast-track approval for the air permits 2 TXU was also under
investigation by the PUCT for alleged market power abuse in the ERCOT
wholesale power market, and in March 2007 investigators issued a notice
of violation and sought a penalty of $210 million. 43 Legislation had already
been introduced to give the PUCT more authority to deter market power
abuse."
The proposed TXU coal plants provoked protests and a high-profile
publicity campaign.45 The January 2007 report by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)" heightened public concern over
greenhouse gas emissions, and TXU became a lightning rod for much of
that concern in Texas. Renewable energy proponents linked green power
and the repeal of the 2005 rider with global climate change, arguing that the
purchase of green power was an immediate action that citizens could take
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without waiting for government to act.
The effect of wind power on electricity costs was an important part
of the 2007 political discussion. Parties who favored keeping the 2005 rider
intact argued that repealing the provision would raise electricity costs for
retail customers.47 The counterstrategy used by renewable energy advocates

42. See Press Release, Environmental Defense, Pressure, Buyout Halts TXU Coal Buildout
in Texas (Feb. 26, 2007), available athttp://www.edf.org/pressrelease.cfm?contentID=5984;
Kelley Shannon, Judge Blocks Perry'sCoal PlantOrder, UrgesDelay ofHearing,DALLAS MORNING
NEws, Feb. 20, 2007.
43. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., Notice of Violation by TXU Corp. et al. of PURA §
39.157(a) and P.U.C. SUBST.R. 25.503(g)(7) (PUC Docket No. 34061) (Mar. 28, 2007) (on file
with Natural Resources Journal).
44. S.B. 483, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. (Tex. 2007) (engrossed). Among other things, the bill
applied the statute's system-wide market concentration test to any "power region, zone, or
functional market recognized by the commission in the power region." In addition, the bill
would have required a generation owner to "sell at auction or otherwise divest additional
entitlements to the utility's Texas jurisdictional installed generation capacity so that a utility
does not control more than.. .25 percent of the installed generation capacity inside an ERCOT
zonal boundary or a functional market recognized by the commission." Id. at 4, 2.
45. Press Release, supranote 42;David Doerr, About 2,000 Rally at CapitolAgainst Proposed
Coal Plants, WACO HERALD TB., Feb. 12, 2007.
46. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report
of the IPCC) (2007), availableat http://www.aaas.org/news/pressroom/climate-change/
media/4thspm2feb07.pdf.
47. Texas Senate Video Archives, http://www.senate.state.tx.us/avarchive/ramav.
php?ram=00003580 (May 27, 2007 floor discussion of conference committee report on H.B.

1090, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. (Tex. 2007)).
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was to pursue the economic linkages even further. They argued that while
the RPS constituted a cost to consumers of about seven cents per 1,000
kWh,' the wind power on the system that year-which came to Texas
because of the RPS-resulted in an estimated $600 million in lower
wholesale power costs, for a savings of about $2 per 1,000 kWh. On the floor
of the House, supporters argued that the cost of the RPS amounted to
spending pennies and saving dollars.49
The Texas House received the Senate's market power bill and
(among other amendments) added language to eliminate the 2005 rider. A
buyout of TXU that was proposed while the legislature was in session,
however, affected the urgency of the market power bill's primary raison
d'etre. Not only did TXU's prospective buyers commit to submitting a
market power mitigation plan to the PUCT for approval, they also canceled
eight of the 11 coal plants and committed to purchasing 1,500 MW of wind
power." The market power bill languished in conference committee.
By then, however, support for repealing the rider had increased in
both chambers. Only three days before the end of the session, the language
was added to a bill already in conference committee to create an
agricultural incentive program to encourage biomass-fueled electric
generation. Opponents in the Senate who had succeeded in killing an earlier
stand-alone bill to repeal the rider had no opportunity to take action against
the amended biomass bill until it came to the Senate floor for final adoption.
With the full Senate voting, the bill passed two days before the close of the
51

Lessons
Political scientist John Kingdon observes that issues tend to rise to
an action point on the public agenda when three independent streams of
events converge: a problem arises, policy options are available, and the
political will exists to do something about the problem. 2 The problem may

48.

PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF TEX., REPORT TO THE 80TH TExAS LEGISLATURE: SCOPE OF

COMPETrION INELECrRIC MARKETS INTExAS 76 (2007), available at http://www.puc.state.tx.
us/electric/reports/scope/index.cfm.
49. Texas House Video Archives, http://www.house.state.tx.us/fx/av/chamber80
/043007p.ram (April 20, 2007 floor discussion of third reading, amendment No. 1, S.B. 483,
2007 Leg., 80th Sess. (Tex. 2007)).
50. Press Release, TXU Corp., TXU to Set New Direction as Private Company; Public
Benefits Include Price Cuts, Price Protection, Investments in Alternative Energy and Stronger
Environmental Policies (Feb. 26,2007) (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
51. The final Senate vote was 27-3; the final House vote was 139-4. Governor Perry signed
the bill into law June 15, 2007. H.B. 1090 2007 Leg. 80th Sess. (rex. 2007) (engrossed).
52. See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIvES AND PUBLIc PoLiciEs (2d
ed. 1997).
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be a single catastrophic event such as a hurricane, experts may identify a
condition that is causing or may cause undesirable consequences, or it may
arise from feedback on existing programs. On a separate track, politicians,
civil servants, and interest groups with technical knowledge about a policy
field continually debate a primordial soup of potential policy options. Ideas
are often put forward speculatively through conference presentations, trade
journals, or even newspaper opinion columns. The political stream
comprises shifts in public opinion, changes in political leadership, or
successful public campaigns by interest groups.
The political evolution of the Texas RPS suggests a corollary to
Kingdon's construct: an idea can advance to a higher place on the public
agenda to the extent that it is linked with another idea for which the three
event streams have converged. Especially in 1999, the state's political
leadership recognized the relationship between renewable power and a
customer's right to choose, to the point that making the RPS part of
restructuring was never really in doubt.53 The often-chaotic process of
consensus building that precedes a major policy shift can sometimes test the
linkage, and as seen in later amendments to the RPS statute, challenges will
be more severe if opposing economic interests stand to lose. The linkages,
therefore, must be theoretically appropriate, empirically defensible, and
politically credible.
It is in the critical consensus-building stage that policy analysis can
play a pivotal role in supporting strategic issue linkage. This does not mean
that well-researched interdependencies will sway the outcome in a heated
floor fight. Conversations with key players in the 2007 session indicate that
while analysis per se did not give the RPS its own top berth on the public
agenda, the analysis did support behind-the-scenes consensus building that
made it easier for lawmakers to link the RPS to an issue that already
enjoyed a high position on the agenda.
IMPLEMENTATION
The manner in which the PUCT implemented the RPS statute has
been a key driver behind the success of renewable energy in Texas. In
contrast to the frenzied pace of a legislative session, PUCT rulemakings
provided a chance for all members of the public to present their arguments
and proposals in thoughtful detail. PUCT staff conducted an initial

53. According to one close observer, the Democratic sponsor of the restructuring
legislation in the Texas House told parties early on that "'[w]e're doing it, and Bush will sign
it.' It really wasn't very subtle or questionable." E-mail from Pat Wood III, former PUCT
chairman and former chairman of FERC, to the author (Aug. 26,2007,10:00 PM MST) (on file
with Natural Resources Journal).
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workshop on July 27, 1999, after which four stakeholder working groups
met six times to negotiate details of the rule. As the commission noted in its
final order,
The rule reflects the work products of the task force and
working groups, incorporating numerous compromises
reached by parties in the technical workshops conducted in
this proceeding. Where consensus could not be reached, staff
considered all views presented in the workshops and in
written comments in drafting the proposed rule.... 54
An important principle has guided the way the PUCT implemented
the statute: the RPS is what the state is legally authorized to require but is
not the extent of what the state can and should accomplish. The distinction
is more than semantics. The original RPS was part of competitive
restructuring, which meant that the law needed to be implemented as
consistently as possible with market principles. To do that, the PUCT
needed to build a practical policy framework in which renewable energy
development overall would be a response both to the RPS mandate and to
customer-driven demand.
The policies adopted by the PUCT reflected a "carrot and stick"
approach. The mandated goal was the stick -2,000 MW translated into
requirements that incurred penalties if not met. The carrot was a portfolio
of measures to ensure that the market was fully able to respond to
voluntary demand for green power -in particular, reducing the potential
for consumer fraud and giving customers the information they needed to
make an informed commercial choice.
Some of the changes that the legislature made to the renewable
energy goal in 2005 corroborated the PUCT's carrot-and-stick framework.
At the same time that it raised the mandate to 5,000 MW, the legislature
added a target of 10,000 MW. This suggests that the legislature intended
that half the job be done by mandate and half by a well-functioning
market.'
Three objectives guided the PUCT rulemakings to implement the
new renewable energy policy framework.
• Create a standard currency for Texas renewable energy,
applicable to any commercial use
" Make renewable energy developers compete with each other
" Make it easy for retail customers to choose green power.

54. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., Rulemaking Relating to Renewable Energy Mandate
Under Section 39.904 of Utilities Code, Order, at 3 (1999).
55. As discussed elsewhere in this article, the addition of section 39.904(m) of the Texas
Utilities Code in 2005 contradicted the PUCT's approach until the provision was eliminated
in 2007. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, when the PUCT devised its rules governing the RPS and
consumer protection between 1999 and 2002, it treated the RPS, the
renewable energy certificate (REC) trading program, and green-power
marketing as an integrated package. All of these pieces were in place when
the RPS requirement commenced along with retail competition on January
1, 2002.
RECs as the Universal Currency for Renewable Power
The Texas REC trading program was the first of its kind, although
California had been exploring the concept as early as the mid-1990s5 6 First
and foremost, Texas RECs needed to enable Texas retailers to satisfy their
RPS compliance burdens. RECs had to provide an accurate account of
eligible renewable energy production, and they had to be tradable between
producers and retailers. The law imposed no further explicit requirement
on the program, giving the PUCT considerable discretion in its design.
If RECs are designed to be an easily traded commodity for the
purposes of compliance with the legal mandates of the RPS, they can serve
non-mandatory purposes just as effectively, depending on the market
environment and the attributes of the RECs. The instrument would function
in exactly the same manner - accurately representing the exclusive value of
a given quantity of a rivalrous commodity - but in different contexts. 7 The
specific attributes of Texas RECs facilitate their use for either purpose.
REC Attributes
The Texas RPS does not distinguish between different types of
eligible renewable resource generating technologies. An REC from wind
power satisfies an RPS obligation just as well as REC earned by a
photovoltaic or biomass facility. The requirements of the RPS were therefore
relatively simple.
Simplicity in the RECs' design also kept them functional for
renewable power demand apart from the RPS. The PUCT anticipated that
customer demand apart from the RIS could at some point follow different
preferences for different technologies. An important question that was

56. For a comparative analysis of REC markets in the United States, see ED HOLT & LORI
BIRD, NATL RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,EMERGING MARKETS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY
CERTIFICATES: OPPORTUNMES AND CHALLENGES 7-8 (2005), available at http://www.eere.
energy. gov/greenpower/resources/pdfs/37388.pdf.
57. "Exclusive" is used here in the formal economic sense of a private good, in that
ownership of an REC prevents the associated amount of renewable energy value from being
appropriated by anyone else. "Rivalrous" means that once an increment of the good is used
or consumed by one person, the economic usefulness of that increment is exhausted and may
no longer be used by anyone else.
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unanswered at the time of the rulemaking was how finely customers would
discriminate between products. Would a typical green-power customer care
whether one biomass facility's nitrous oxide (NO) emission rate was twice
that of another? Or would the customer's main reference point be simply
binary: does the technology produce air emissions (e.g., burning wood
waste) or not (e.g., wind or solar)?
In the restructured Texas market, retail entities that offer green
power products do so by aggregating RECs from various sources into a
single product. Even if two biomass facilities had different emission rates,
they would be averaged into a composite rate if combined in the same retail
product; it is not likely that customers would see the difference between the
two plants even if they cared about it. Moreover, if an individual REC were
to include emission data, someone would have to provide it. Acquiring
reliable emission data would impose a tradeoff: significantly higher costs
if the data were obtained by the REC trading program administrator or the
need for verification if the data were self-provided by the facility owner.
Given the questionable commercial usefulness and high cost of
obtaining reliable emissions data, the PUCT decided not to include emission
data on an REC. Instead, it determined that customers would most likely
discriminate broadly among technology types and required identification
of the type on the REC itself.
The PUCT opted for a parsimonious REC design. Each Texas REC
carries a serial number that comprises:
* the specific facility that generated the electricity;
" the type of renewable resource generating the electricity;
* the year and quarter the electricity was generated; and
• a unique identifier for specific megawatt-hours produced by
the facility that quarter.'
At the same time, however, the PUCT approved protocols for the
REC trading program that called for posting a table containing carbon
dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), NO, and particulate matter emissions
data for certified REC generating facilities. The table initially contained
average emission rates for all units of a given technology type, but the
protocols allow for reporting unit-specific rates if so directed by the PUCT.
As the program has transpired, the differences in emission rates
among renewable energy generators that have emissions are not yet
commercially significant. About 98 percent of the renewable energy
production in Texas to date has been from wind power, which is all zeroemission. Such differences may become commercially significant if the

58. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., ERCOT Protocols, Section 14: State of Texas Renewable Energy Credit Trading Program 14-3 (2008).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

Texas Legislature establishes a separate RPS for non-wind technologies,
which was proposed but not enacted in 2007.59
Lifespan
Another threshold issue the PUCT had to decide was the REC life
cycle. The need for tradability creates a puzzle with respect to how long an
REC is valid. RECs that exist for a long time are easier to trade; however,
more RECs than these are in existence at any given time. Greater supply of
RECs means less incentive to add more renewable energy capacity, yet the
objective of an RIPS is to stimulate more renewable energy production.
On the other hand, the risk associated with short-lived commodities
is difficult to manage. The balance between demand and supply, including
their respective price elasticities, tends to determine the market price of a
commodity. If supply or demand changes faster than the ability of prices to
respond, prices tend to be unstable and the market becomes a riskier place
to enter into fixed-price contracts. Thus, if RECs have a short life span,
supply is solely a function of immediate production, which in the case of
Texas is a function of how much the wind blows. Prices are volatile, which
can deter market participation and market expansion.
The PUCT set the life of an REC at three years. The intent was to
give renewable energy producers and electric retailers alike a hedge against
year-to-year fluctuations in REC production so that one year's surplus
production could be used in the event of an unusual decline in production
or surge in demand the following year.
At the same time, the lifespan was considered short enough to
encourage traders to "chum" their inventories -pricing older RECs below
new RECs-so that the greatest number of RECs would be used
productively. RECs that expire unused amount to leaving money on the
table, which any profit-maximizing producer, trader, or retailer always
seeks to avoid. Maximizing REC use tends to reduce market prices, both
reducing the cost of RIPS compliance and aiding the development of
voluntary green-power demand.
Trading
The life cycle of an REC has three stages: production, trading, and
termination. The rules adopted by the PUCT treat trading as entirely within
the private sector, with very little PUCT involvement. An REC may be
traded any number of times between its creation and its ultimate use, and

59.

H.B. 1214, 2007 Leg., 80th Sess. (Tex. 2007).
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it is not even necessary for each intermediary transaction to be recorded
with the trading program administrator. 6°
The PUCT, through the REC trading program administrator,
certifies the production and awarding of new RECs and the ultimate
retirement of RECs either for the satisfaction of an RPS requirement or for
voluntary purposes. 61 In neither of these functions is the market value of an
REC germane; therefore, the PUCT does not require the disclosure of the
prices at which RECs are traded. What matters from a legal and regulatory
standpoint is who the bona fide owner is at the time an REC is retired.
RECs are initially awarded to the owner of a certified renewable
energy facility; every megawatt-hour produced by the facility during the
quarter earns one REC. Once a new REC is placed in the producer's
account, it may be traded any number of times at whatever price the seller
and buyer negotiate. Within three years, each REC is terminated in one of
three ways: it may be applied to a retailer's RPS requirement; it may be
retired for a purpose other than the RPS, at the discretion of the current REC
owner; or it expires unused if not applied to one of the two other uses.6 2
In short, the PUCT sought to make RECs as commercially
functional as possible. It avoided encumbering RECs with information and
requirements that were not necessary to the transactions that were likely to
occur. It also made the life of an REC long enough to permit risk
management and short enough to prevent supply stagnation.
Competition Among Renewable Energy Suppliers
The RPS requirement is a guarantee that a minimum amount of
demand for renewable energy will exist in the Texas market. Yet no
individual renewable energy supplier is guaranteed any part of that
demand; those who want it have to compete for it. Those who compete take
upon themselves the capital risk. A developer's ability to earn a return on
investment depends on his ability to find a buyer for the energy generated
and the RECs accrued.
Combining the growing demand for green power into the same
market as the RPS means that there is no fixed upper limit to total
renewable energy demand. In a normal market, competition among
potential suppliers reduces prices, and as prices fall demand increases. So

60. To use a simplified example, Producer A may sell to Trader B without recording the
exchange with the program administrator, and then in turn B may sell to Retailer C. The
exchange may be recorded ultimately with the program administrator as a transfer from A
to C, with B's intermediary role legally governed solely by its contractual arrangements with
A and C.
61. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.173(k) (2008).
62. Id.
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while the RPS provided a fixed minimum demand, renewable energy
developers themselves have the ability to stimulate additional demand
through aggressive price competition in the voluntary green-power market.
Robust competition requires easy entry into the market. PUCT rules
established a streamlined administrative certification for eligible REC
generators; if a renewable energy facility meets the criteria, it will be
approved within 30 days. The facility must meet the statutory definition of
renewable energy, must have been built after 1999 (if 2 MW or larger), must
be metered, may obtain no more than two percent of its annual heat input
from fossil fuel combustion, 63 and may not be an existing fossil fuel plant
that has been re-powered to use biomass or some other renewable energy
input. All of these requirements are simple findings of fact that, if
uncontested, allow quick review and ministerial approval.
Certification as an REC generator means that the facility receives
RECs when it generates power, but it confers no other approval. A
renewable energy facility still has to meet all other environmental and siting
requirements imposed on other generators. In ERCOT, any entity
generating power and selling it at wholesale must register with the PUCT
as a power generating company (PGC), regardless of the type of fuel being
used to generate power. Any new unit connected to the ERCOT grid must
cooperate with ERCOT in a transmission interconnection study prior to
generating power for the grid and must follow ERCOT market and
operating protocols.
In short, REC generators are on a level playing field with respect to
all other generation technologies and the rules for transmission interconnection. State law guarantees nondiscriminatory access to both the
transmission system and the wholesale power market by any generation
entity.' The only significant difference between renewable technologies and
all other generating technologies is the ability to earn RECs.
Both the RPS mandate and the voluntary green-power market turn
to the same supply pool, for which Texas RECs are the standard currency.
One large supply pool tends to be more competitive than many small ones,
and competition changes supplier behavior.6 Not only do developers

63. For example, renewable generators powered by biomass may use a small amount of
natural gas to start combustion as long as the natural gas accounts for less than two percent
of the plant's annual heat input.
64. See TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 35.004(b) (Vernon 2003).
65. The point may be illustrated by way of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is a
common measure of market competitiveness used in antitrust law to assess the implications
of major mergers. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, passim,
(revised Apr. 8,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/hmgl.html
1997). To take a simple example, two markets, each with a sole supplier, would each have an
HHI score of 10,000, which indicates a perfect monopoly. If the markets were combined into
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operate more efficiently and price their products lower, they also tend to
speculate. As with other commodities such as real estate, speculative
investment by competitors trying to keep ahead of the market has resulted
in surplus supply. For example, about 3,100 MW of renewable capacity
existed in Texas at the beginning of 2007. The RPS required 1,400 MW for
that year, while green power demand (based on a simple linear growth
trend) was expected to take up 350 MW or more. The difference was an
expected surplus of about 1,350 MW over total 2007 demand, not including
the new capacity - more than 1,300 MW - that came on line during 2007.
Figure 2 shows the historical utilization of renewable energy capacity in
Texas, divided between the RPS mandate, green-power sales, and supply
surplus.
Surplus is a sign that the market is functioning normally. It is also
an important input to price determination. Rental vacancy rates and the
average length of time a house is on the market are indicators of surplus
supply, and higher vacancy rates usually signal lower rents. Like their real
estate counterparts, competitive renewable energy suppliers will build a
certain amount of supply speculating on future demand, especially if they
believe the green power market will continue to grow. As in other
commodity markets where prices are determined by relative supply and
demand, prices fall as surpluses grow.
Choosing Green Power
PUCT rules with respect to green power have two closely related
policy drivers. One is legal: to deter deceptive trade practices. The other is
to ensure that all customers have sufficient information to make reasoned
choices that satisfy their various consumer preferences.
Both these drivers were addressed by the PUCT through product
labeling requirements. Customer protection rules direct any retail electric
provider to give its residential and small commercial customers an
electricity facts label. The rules specify a standard label content and format,
with the objective of providing customers with an easy means of comparing
different retail electricity offerings. Each label displays the product's
estimated cost, fuel mix, and air emission profile.

a single market with two suppliers, the HHI score for the new market would be 5,000-still
concentrated, but no longer a perfect monopoly. Any combining of separate markets into a
single market reduces the HI as long as there is no corresponding loss or combining of
individual competitors. For more on the distinction between monopoly behavior and
competitive behavior, see generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL Er AL., CONTESTABLE MARKEIS AND
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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Deceptive trade Practices
Consumer confidence is important to the development of new
markets such as green power. Fraud is one of the quickest ways to destroy
consumer confidence, especially if a poorly constructed law or a lax
regulatory framework enables fraud to become widespread.
Double-counting renewable energy sold to customers is regarded
as a deceptive trade practice.' Two kinds of double-counting are pertinent
to green power: fraudulently selling the same electricity to rivalrous users
and fraudulently selling the same electricity for rivalrous purposes.67 In
other words, selling a given amount of green power to a given customer for
a given purpose should make that power unavailable to any other customer
or for any other purpose.
There is no physical distinction between electricity generated by
wind power and electricity generated by a coal plant once the electrons get
on the transmission system. Consequently, PUCT rules treat the electrical
work value of renewable power as an economically distinct commodity.
However, the fact that the power is generated by a renewable resource is
another distinct source of economic value responding to both the RI'S and
to green-power demand, a value separate from the electricity's work value.
Fluctuations in the renewable source value are independent of the generic
work value of the electricity passing through the meter.
To illustrate, assume that the owner of a wind farm receives an REC
for each megawatt-hour of electricity generated. If the owner sells one
megawatt-hour of electricity under a green power contract to Buyer A and
sells the RECs to Buyer B, then the owner would be double-counting that
one megawatt-hour of renewable energy production. Buyer A would sell
the electricity to retail customers as green power (combining both the work
value and the renewable value), while Buyer B would buy generic power
from elsewhere and combine its work value with the renewable value of the
RECs.

66. See NAT'L ASS'N OF ATMIYs GEN., ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING GUIDELINES FOR
ELECrRIcrrY (1999), available at http://www.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/buying/pdfs/
naag_0100.pdf; CTR. FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, NORTH AMERIcAN AsSOCTION OF ISSUING
BODIES: DOUBLE COUNTING BESrPRACnCES (May 5, 2006) (working group decision document),
http://www.resource-solutions.org/policy/naaib/docs/FinalWGDecisionDraftNAAIBDoubleCounting-best-practices9.pdf.
67. In economic terms, "rivalrous" means that a given unit of a commodity may be used
only once. Public goods such as police security are nonrivalrous in that protection for one
person does not prevent protection of any other. Private goods such as real estate and
automobiles are rivalrous in that ownership and use by one person or partnership precludes
concurrent ownership and use by another.
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Therefore, two megawatt-hours of renewable power value would
be accounted for in the market although only one had been generated. The
commercial expectation on the part of either buyer - that the purchase was
an exclusive entitlement to the production of one unique megawatt-hour of
electricity from renewable energy -would be violated, with both buyers
unaware of the violation.
Double counting for rivalrous purposes is similar to selling to
rivalrous users, except that it involves an additional step and different
actors. A retail electric provider conveys to the customer one megawatthour of renewable energy value when it applies an REC to the sale of green
power to that customer. Here, too, the commercial expectation is that the
green-power purchase represented by the REC becomes the customer's
exclusive entitlement to the use of one unique megawatt-hour of renewable
power. If, in addition, it were to count the green-power sale toward its RPS
requirement, however, the retailer would be retaining one megawatt-hour
of renewable energy value. Again, the market would be accounting for two
megawatt-hours of renewable energy value when only one megawatt-hour
had actually been produced.
Fraud can be established if the seller makes a material representation that is false, the seller knows the representation is false, the seller
intends to induce the buyer to act upon the representation, and the buyer
actually and justifiably relies on the representation and thereby suffers
injury.6s It would be economically irrational for a customer to willingly pay
a premium for a good or service such as green power unless the premium
conveyed something of additional worth to the customer. If the value
sought by the customer were a personal, additional, and distinct contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels
and the seller represented that the purchase would secure such value, then
the buyer would suffer injury if he or she were to pay the premium and the
purchase failed to effect the reduction that was represented. Therefore,
double-counting the value of the same megawatt-hour of green power
raises the question of fraud because the personal, additional, and distinct
reduction expected by the buyer is eliminated.69
PUCT rules require that all services provided by Texas retail electric
providers to residential and small commercial customers must carry a label,
and that "the retirement of RECs shall be the only method of authenticating

68. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W. 3d 573,577 (Tex. 2001).
69. A dilemma is created when double counting is the result of circumstances beyond the
control of the seller, as was the case when the legislature amended the RPS statute in 2005. See
supra note 14. Double counting that is a consequence of state law instead of the retailer's
intent could still fail the four-pronged test used by the Texas Supreme Court in Ernst & Young
if the retailer marketed green power knowing that state law created a double-counting regime.
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generation for which a REC has been issued.... "70 Thus, the owner of a wind
farm is prohibited from selling "renewable" electricity under a power
purchase agreement to one customer and separately selling to another the
RECs earned by that wind farm. The rule encourages what has become a
common business practice: selling both the energy and the RECs to the same
customer under the same contract.
The PUCT addressed the problem of double-counting for rivalrous
purposes by requiring a retailer to distribute its RPS obligation on a pro rata
basis among all of its retail products." For example, if a retailer's RPS
obligation amounts to two percent of its total sales, each retail service it
offers - green or not - must show at least two-percent renewable content on
its electricity facts label. This requirement makes it mathematically
impossible for a retailer to use its RPS requirement to back a premiumpriced green-power product. Instead, a retailer would have to buy and
voluntarily retire additional RECs to authenticate customer sales made
under a green-power label.
Stakeholder positions were split on this provision during PUCT
rulemakings. Incumbent retail providers that had been spun off from the
old utilities opposed it, while new retail electric providers - especially those
planning to serve the green power market - supported it. The new market
entrants were concerned that, given the sheer size of the incumbents' legacy
customer bases and the resulting volume of an incumbent's RPS requirement, the incumbent retailers would hold an unfair competitive advantage
at the genesis of the Texas green-power market. Unless rules required it, an
incumbent would not need to purchase additional RECs in order to offer
green-power services because it could simply incorporate its large REC
requirement into a single product. A market entrant seeking to sell green
power would not have a legacy customer base and would have to purchase
RECs above its numerically small RPS requirement; consequently, the
market entrant would face an additional cost of doing business.
Customer Awareness
The PUCT conducted a statewide customer education program a
year before retail competition began on January 1, 2002. The program
continued throughout the first years of full market operation. The campaign
aimed to inform customers of their right to choose a retail electric provider.
The electricity facts label was part of the PUCT's customer
education campaign. The intent was to make the label a standard, objective,
state-certified source of consumer information so that customers could rely
on the label's summary of information without having to research the

70.
71.

16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 25.476(f)(4) (2008).
Id. § 25.476(0(7).
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methodology underlying the provider's claims. Retailers providing the label
must follow PUCT rules governing the calculation of label information, and
the PUCT monitors and enforces compliance.
Requiring a standard format allows a customer to put two labels
side by side and see at a glance which product has the most renewable
energy content and which has the least impact on emissions. Estimated
monthly costs also appear in a standardized format on the same label, thus
enabling a customer to compare both price and renewable content at the
same time.
Labeling rules are interlocked with rules governing the RPS and
REC trading. For example, if a retailer sells service under a label that
represents the electricity as coming entirely from renewable energy sources,
the retailer has only to retire voluntarily the same number of RECs as the
amount of megawatt-hours sold. The RECs provide the retailer with
considerable flexibility in managing the uncertainty of actual sales volume.
It can purchase under contract the amount of RECs that it projects it will
need for the coming year based on its business plan and forecasts. If the
forecast is too low, the retailer can simply buy more RECs on the spot
market; if the forecast is too high, the retailer can keep the excess RECs for
use next year.
Other Implementation Issues
In addition to the preceding, the PUCT addressed a number of
major issues that had not been addressed explicitly in the statute; the most
controversial issue was the treatment of renewable energy capacity that had
been in existence prior to the RPS.
The purpose behind an RPS is to create an incentive to build new
renewable capacity; logically, there would be little purpose in providing
such an incentive to capacity that already exists. Many states with an RPS
have had to address the same issue.
Most of the renewable power capacity in Texas prior to the RPS was
hydroelectric, and most of that served electric cooperatives and municipally
owned utilities. Senate Bill 7 gave each co-op and MOU the option of
opening its service territory to retail competition. Only if it opted in would
a co-op or MOU have an RPS obligation. Consequently, how the PUCT
decided to treat existing capacity had the potential to change the way a coop or MOU estimated the net benefit of opting in to competition.
In the end, the PUCT decided to allow a retail entity that had
historically owned or purchased power from a pre-existing renewable
energy facility to apply the output of a typical year toward its RPS
requirement. Each existing unit's "offset" was a fixed number based on
recent production. Most important, the offset could be used only by the
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entity purchasing the power as of 2001 and could not be conveyed to any
other party.7'
The PUCT also determined that ERCOT was the logical entity to
administer the RPS and the REC trading program according to PUCT rules.
Administering the RPS would require access to detailed data on generation
and load, and as system operator, ERCOT already had nearly all of the data
required.
Post-implementation Stakeholder Issues
The first years of the RPS program saw a regulatory tug-of-war
between the PUCT and different parties with different economic interests
in the RPS. The PUCT was attempting to create a self-sustaining market for
Texas renewable power, and a stable market requires stable rules. Once the
RPS took effect in 2002, the PUCT made a number of changes addressing
minor procedural issues, but for the most part the PUCT avoided major
substantive changes.
Nevertheless, various stakeholders petitioned the PUCT for
substantive revisions that had the effect of changing the size of the mandate
in the RPS calculation. Retailers sought changes reducing requirements; the
wind industry sought changes to increase them.
Both attempts were consequences of the McCamey transmission
congestion-the type of problem that SB 20's CREZ provisions addressed
later. McCamey is a sparsely populated area in West Texas with little native
load. The transmission system in 2001 had been sufficient to serve the
historical needs of the area's oil and gas production (which then was in
decline) but was not sufficient to accommodate all the wind power
generation added in 2000 and 2001. Consequently, ERCOT had to curtail
wind power production frequently during the spring of 2002, which is
normally the most productive season for wind power.
Transmission congestion resulted in less wind power production
and fewer RECs on the market during the first year of retail competition.
REC prices increased significantly just before the first RPS requirement was
assessed, and retailers asked the commission to defer all of their 2002 RPS
requirement until the McCamey congestion problem was solved.73
The rule implementing the RPS said that events beyond a retail
electric provider's control could be grounds for waiving a compliance
penalty. While the rule stated that lack of transmission capacity could be

72. Id. § 25.173(i).
73. See INmAL COMMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR RETAIL MARKETERS, PUG RULEMAKING
TO AMEND SUBSrANTIVE RULE § 25.173 (Goal for Renewable Energy No. 26848, P.U.C. of Tex.,
Dec. 23, 2002).
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beyond a retailer's control, "[a] party is responsible for conducting
sufficient advance planning to acquire its allotment of RECs. Failure of the
spot or short-term market to supply a party with the allocated number of
RECs shall not constitute an event outside the competitive retailer's
reasonable control." 74
Even with the curtailments, production from the 755 MW of
McCamey wind power provided the market with enough RECs to meet a
400 MW RPS requirement. The PUCT did not change any retailer's
requirement, but it did agree to increase to ten percent from five percent the
amount of RPS allocation that a retailer could carry over to 2003 and 2004.
The flipside of the congestion argument came a year later when
wind power developers petitioned the PUCT to change its computational
procedures to account for the transmission constraints and curtailments.
Commission rules convert each year's capacity requirement into an annual
energy requirement by formula:
capacity requirement (MW) x capacity conversion factor x 8,760 hours.
The capacity conversion factor (CCF) is the estimated annual
capacity factor for all units receiving RECs. The rules require that every two
years the CCF shall be readjusted to reflect "actual generatorperformance
data" associated with "all renewable resources in the trading program...."'
The wind power curtailments resulting from transmission congestion in the
McCamey area, however, depressed the calculated CCF to 27 percent,
below the initial 35 percent set for the first two years of the program, and
far below the 35 percent to 40 percent that wind developers said could have
been produced had there been no transmission congestion.
The PUCT voted to set aside the 27 percent calculation and
maintain the CCF at 35 percent for the next two years. The higher CCF
increased retailers' RPS allocations by about 20 percent, and some of them
appealed the decision in district court. The court remanded the decision
back to the PUCT on procedural grounds,76 and the CCF was recalculated
as provided in the rule. Each retailer's overassessment for 2004 was applied
as a reduction to its 2005 RPS obligation, reducing the total RPS requirement
for 2005 by about 25 percent. The market was suddenly glutted, contributing to a precipitous drop in REC prices.

74. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., supra note 54, at 91.
75. Id. § 25.173()(1) (emphasis added).
76. The court ordered the PUCT to set the CCF as required by the plain language of the
rule. Reliant Energy Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., No. GN403661 (Tex. Dist. 126th May
4, 2005).
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Lessons
The PUCT implemented the RPS with the intent of making
competition the engine of a market transformation process in which clean
technologies could grow economically. Competition worked despite the
compromises made along the way in large part because the PUCT crafted
mechanisms for achieving the legal mandates of the RPS that at the same
time smoothed the way for retailers to surpass the mandates and approach
the more aspirational goals of the RPS.
Perhaps even more importantly, the Texas experience suggests a
broader public policy conclusion: the best opportunities for renewable
energy policy are often embedded in a state's unique political, economic,
and historical circumstances. Barry Rabe contends that many of the most
effective state agency efforts to address global climate change are not so
much due to standard policy formulas, but rather to the ability of "policy
entrepreneurs" to seize sometimes hidden opportunities that arise on the
state political landscape and to build coalitions that can turn the
opportunities into effective policy. 77 These policy entrepreneurs are
"individuals who command widespread respect for their expertise on a
given issue and their integrity as credible brokers of information." 7 They
may be political appointees, career civil servants, or advisors outside the
official structure, but, whatever they may be officially, they are "well
positioned to see opportunities for new policy and to literally translate ideas
for innovation into workable policies."'
The Texas experience, therefore, is unique only in the form of the
particular opportunities that arose. A different state will have different
circumstances, but the Texas experience suggests a number of general
principles that can guide a state's policy entrepreneurs as they attempt to
seize their own opportunities.
The Real Goal Is Renewable Energy That Is Economically Sustainable
While a literal and narrow reading of statutory language may
suggest that an RIS is simply a quantitative goal, it matters how the state
achieves its numbers. An entrepreneurial approach to implementing an RPS
would regard the statutory goal as a means of achieving economic
sustainability-a qualitative goal that more fully embodies the public
interest. This implicit goal constitutes a test: does an RPS implementation
strategy promote technological transformation toward an end state in which
renewable energy is economically competitive with fossil fuel generation?

77. See RABE, supra note 10, at 21-29.
78. Id. at 23.

79. Id.
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The PUCT approached the test by designing the RIPS as a springboard for
a green-power market. The RPS seeded demand on the expectation that
over time competition for the RPS will reduce costs, with lower costs
leading to greater voluntary demand and greater economies of scale.
Competition Works
While ERCOT may be the most competitive electricity market in the
country, it does not follow that other states must adopt the Texas model in
order to make competition work. An entrepreneurial approach to RIS
implementation would look for opportunities to make renewable energy
suppliers compete with each other for market share. The opportunities
would be unique to each state's political and regulatory circumstances. The
more competitors enter the market, the more all will work to keep costs low.
If the policy entrepreneurs can somehow build competition into how an
RPS is implemented, prices paid by end-use customers will be lower,
promoting further demand for renewable energy.
An RPS, an REC Tracking System, and Green-Power Policies Are Best
Implemented as a Package, Not Separately
It makes little sense for a state to develop an REC tracking system
if there is neither an RIS nor a cohesive demand for green power. RECs
facilitate RPS compliance and provide the liquidity necessary for a greenpower market to evolve, but by themselves they create no value. The design
of an RPS should also mesh with marketing requirements for green power
so that the RPS provides suppliers with a reasonable assurance of market
demand and customers can have confidence in what they purchase.
An RPS Goal Should Leave Room for Green Power to Grow
As counterintuitive as it may seem at first glance, the ideal RI'S goal
is modest rather than ambitious. This is a particularly difficult lesson to
apply politically because larger numbers attract more attention. Nevertheless, Texas has succeeded because its relatively modest RPS is not intended
to be (as Texans say) "the whole enchilada." A state's renewable energy
achievement is actually the sum of its RI'S requirement, its voluntary
demand for green power, and speculative development by competitors
seeking to stay ahead of the market. An over-ambitious RPS will squeeze
the voluntary green-power market, thereby undermining what should be
the policy end game: economically sustainable renewable energy
deployment.' If policy makers aim to develop an RPS in conjunction with

80. For a detailed discussion of RIS requirements, REC supply, and voluntary green
power, see BLAIR SWEZEY ET AL., PRELMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
BALANCE FOR RENEWABLE ELECrRICrrY (NREL Technical Report NREL/TP-670-42266, 2007),
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customer-chosen green power (see previous lessons), the level of the RPS
should be high enough to seed the market but low enough to give green
power a realistic chance to grow.
The Regime of Rules Must Be Stable
Stakeholders always want what is better for them, but most also
place a high premium on predictability. Policies need not be perfect as long
as they are workable. Participants with invested capital at stake tend to
prefer a good, stable regime to one that is nearly perfect but constantly
changing. Indeed, one of the most tangible price disruptions the Texas REC
market has experienced so far was a consequence of the one time the PUCT
attempted to set aside its own rules on an ad hoc basis.8' It is normal for a
market to react to external shocks and influences; if the rules are
consistently enforced, the players can manage.
PrivateInterests Do Not Always Coincide with the Public Interest
The basic economic drive for competitive advantage becomes a
stronger impetus for corporate action as a renewable energy technology
moves from the research and development stage into market deployment.
While market-driven deployment of renewable energy technologies in
general is in the public interest, those in the business may advocate doing
so in ways that are not. For example, if a state's renewable energy policy
favors an oligopoly of suppliers and discourages new suppliers from
entering the market, prices will remain high and deployment will remain
limited - an outcome that would be in the private interests of the supplier
oligopoly 82 but would not be in the public interest. Arbitrating between
renewable energy's private interests and the public interest when the two
differ is one of the most challenging tasks a policy entrepreneur faces.
CONCLUSIONS
Policy entrepreneurs committed to renewable energy find
opportunities by regarding an RPS as one causal element in a complex
system of economic interests, legal constraints, political history, and
physical and human resources. Opportunities may present themselves in
various forms unique to a particular state. In Texas, the opportunities lay

availableat http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/42266.pdf.
81. See supra text accompanying note 64.
82. This would be the case if the oligopoly supplier's markup on a small sales volume
were significantly larger than the markup it would realize on a larger volume in a competitive
market. Markups tend to be larger for oligopolies and monopolies than for suppliers in a
competitive market.
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in integrating the RPS with the overall electric restructuring effort set in
motion by SB 7.
An RPS, an REC tracking system, and a green-power market all
work best when designed as a package. Similarly, the success of the
package depends on how well it works with external factors. The RPS has
not been the only driver for wind power development in Texas; much of the
credit also goes to the federal production tax credit (PTC). Yet while the
PTC was a major factor in making wind power economically feasible, that
benefit was not unique to Texas. A wind farm built anywhere in the United
States would get the same PTC. What made developers go to Texas rather
than other states with better wind resources was the market potential
afforded by the Texas RI'S and easy entry to compete for that market by
virtue of ERCOT's nondiscriminatory transmission access.
Integrating an RPS with customer-chosen green power changes the
political and economic rationale for increasing renewable energy capacity.
Many previous state and federal renewable energy policies -especially
those relying on rebates and other buy-downs - have reflected a "whatever
it costs" approach to increasing renewable energy use. Sustainability has an
economic side, however: it will be impossible to deploy enough renewable
capacity to reduce the amount of fossil fuel used to generate electricity if the
cost of the technology remains high. Only by bankrupting itself could a
society deploy enough of the technology to make a significant difference,
and political organisms do not willingly commit economic suicide.
In Texas and in many other states, opponents of renewable energy
frequently argue that wind power and other clean technologies should
compete economically with fossil fuel technologies without any state
assistance at all. Economic sustainability does not imply laissez-faire
policies, however. Opportune technologies mature toward competitiveness
over time, and a progressive policy would aim to remove impediments to
technological evolution. Such an approach is anything but laissez-faire, but
it does require more than simple subsidies. Program designs must
contemplate a longer time horizon, accommodate a host of external factors
(many of which are also evolving), and adapt to the reality of risk and
uncertainty.
The Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard is not an off-the-shelf
policy than can work anywhere as is. A number of other states have
implemented RPS policies, and the results have varied as much as the wind
itself. Details matter, but perhaps the most important and applicable lesson
arising from the Texas experience is that it also matters how the RPS fits
into the big picture.
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Figure 1: How Wind Power Puts Downward Pressure on Wholesale Prices
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ordered from least costly to most costly. For daily operating purposes, cost
is largely a function of the cost of the unit's fuel. Each point on the supply
curve indicates how much capacity would be profitable (x-axis) at a given
market price (y-axis). The market clearing price is determined by the
intersection of the demand and supply curves.
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Figure 2: Utilization of Renewable Energy Capacity Installed in Texas 83
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Note: Annual green power demand for 2007 is estimated based on
a simple linear trend from previous years. "Capacity surplus" includes
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83. ELEC. REUABiLITY COUNCIL OF TEX., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE TEXAS RENEWABLE
ENERGY CREDIT TRADING PROGRAM (2001-2006) (compiled from annual reports for each of
these years).

